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For several years, judges, court staff, and a growing numberof lawyers have recognized that at least one party is notrepresented by a lawyer in a sizeable portion of family law
and smaller civil cases.  Often both parties are self-represented.
Two underlying factors associated with self-represented litiga-
tion—the relative scarcity of affordable legal services and an
increased “do-it-yourself” attitude by many litigants—are fairly
self-evident.  What is less clear is how best to ensure that these
litigants have sufficient access to the justice system to be able
to resolve legal problems fairly and effectively.
Courts and legal service providers have tried a variety of
approaches to address the needs of self-represented litigants.
Some maintain that the best solution is to steer litigants back
toward competent legal counsel and so have focused their
efforts on promoting greater lawyer participation in pro bono
programs and securing adequate funding for legal services
agencies.  Some provide self-represented litigants with basic
materials and legal resources such as simplified forms and
instructions to help litigants maneuver their way through the
civil justice system.  Still others champion the use of alternative
dispute resolution programs, trying to divert self-represented
litigants away from the more adversarial and procedurally com-
plex venue of traditional court proceedings.  Although each of
these approaches can claim some measure of success, it is clear
that none has been fully effective.
This article describes how the influx of self-represented liti-
gants has forced many within the court and legal communities
to reconsider some of the fundamental premises on which the
civil justice system is based and to respond in new and creative
ways to changing litigant demands on existing court and legal
resources.  It focuses on changes to the delivery of legal services
to low- and moderate-income people, especially the emergence
of “unbundled” legal services, and addresses the practical
implications related to the distinction between legal informa-
tion and legal advice.  Finally, it describes how judges and court
staff are rethinking the conceptual design of the civil justice
system and addressing specific factors associated with legal
complexity and the inherent limitations of laypersons that cre-
ate barriers to access for self-represented litigants.
SCARCITY OF AFFORDABLE LEGAL SERVICES
The major factor contributing to the increase in self-repre-
sented litigation is fairly obvious: a sizeable number of self-rep-
resented litigants proceed without a lawyer simply because they
lack sufficient income to afford one.  This trend has been well-
documented for quite some time.  In 1994, for example, the
American Bar Association conducted an in-depth study of the
legal needs of low-income Americans and found that 47% of
low-income households experienced a new or existing legal
need each year, but only 29% were addressed through the
legal/judicial system and 38% went unaddressed altogether.1 A
second study of the legal needs of moderate-income Americans
had similar findings.  An estimated 52% of moderate-income
households experienced a new or existing legal need each year,
but only 39% of those needs were addressed through the
legal/judicial system and 26% went unaddressed altogether.2
Both studies indicated that the vast majority of legal problems
encountered were relatively uncomplicated, both factually and
legally.  The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), which was cre-
ated in 1974 to provide legal assistance to low-income
Americans, estimates that four out of every five income-eligible
people who apply for assistance are turned away because the
LSC lacks the resources to help them all.3 Despite the best
intentions of the legal community, two decades of pro bono
recruitment efforts have not yet begun to fill the gap in legal
assistance needs for these low-income Americans. Nor are they
likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
The results of these unmet needs are two-fold.  First, many
people simply do without legal solutions.  They give up on
recovering damages from minor contractual disagreements or
smaller civil claims, or fail to defend against claims asserted
against them for which they would otherwise have a legal rem-
edy or defense.  Others delay filing for divorce until some
unspecified time in the future when they or their estranged
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spouses might be able to afford a lawyer, and in the meantime
muddle through with informal (and hence unenforceable)
agreements for child support and the distribution of assets and
debts.  Most are unaware of the potential consequences of
doing without legal assistance.  Second, those who do not have
the option to forgo a legal remedy are forced to navigate the
civil justice system without a lawyer, becoming the ubiquitous
pro se litigants that cause so much consternation for judges,
court staff, and lawyers representing opposing parties or other
litigants on the docket.
Judicial and legal policy makers have gradually come to the
realization that there will never be enough affordable legal ser-
vices to meet the demand for full legal representation for all eli-
gible individuals.  Given existing budgetary constraints, a
400% increase in funding for legal services is highly unlikely.
Similarly unlikely is a dramatic increase in pro bono activity by
lawyers, a dramatic decrease in legal fees, or a return to the
barter system of an earlier era in which clients could pay for
legal assistance with their own goods or services.
This new understanding has spurred two significant shifts in
philosophy—one within the courts community about what
constitutes the principal components of access to justice and
another within the legal community about how best to deliver
legal services.  For judges and court staff, the initial concern
was how to address the ethical and practical implications of
increased numbers of self-represented litigants.  The departure
from the traditional model of litigants represented by compe-
tent attorneys posed enormous challenges for courts in terms of
both increased staff time and administrative costs as well as
perceived restrictions on the ability of judges and court staff to
offer meaningful assistance.
An early response by many courts was to vigorously main-
tain existing barriers to self-representation—for example, by
strictly enforcing “no legal advice” policies for court staff and
holding self-represented litigants to the most exacting proce-
dural standards—in hopes that these efforts would discourage
litigants from seeking legal recourse in the courts without first
obtaining competent legal representation.  Over time, however,
some courts changed their minds about the wisdom of this
approach—in part, because it was largely ineffective and ulti-
mately counter-productive.  In spite of barriers, the number of
self-represented litigants continued to rise, and the failure of
courts to offer them any assistance not only exacerbated logis-
tical problems but also undermined public trust and confidence
in the courts as effective and responsive social institutions.
An even more important consideration was the growing
realization that the majority of self-represented litigants had
legitimate legal problems that could only be resolved through
judicial intervention.  The concept of access to justice has long
been considered by the civil justice community as synony-
mous with access to a lawyer, largely out of recognition that
the American justice system is an extraordinarily complex
institution.  This framework, however, has always been
premised on the
assumption of an
adequate supply of
affordable legal ser-
vices: judicial and
legal policy makers
had not contem-
plated how low- and
m o d e r a t e - i n c o m e
people would obtain
access to justice if the
cost of legal services
increased beyond the
financial means of
most households or, for that matter, of government agencies to
provide to eligible individuals.  As the new reality took hold, a
growing number of judicial policy makers adopted the view
that a fundamental requirement of access to justice is access to
the courts and that access to lawyers, as articulated in the
Sixth Amendment, is not sufficient by itself to ensure access to
justice.4 This new outlook prompted a radical change in the
willingness of courts to respond to the needs of self-repre-
sented litigants. 
At the same time that the courts were grappling with the
implications of growing numbers of self-represented litigants,
the legal community, especially lawyers who regularly worked
with low- and moderate-income individuals, was forced to con-
front how changing economic circumstances were affecting the
delivery of legal services.  The traditional view was that any-
thing less than full-service representation was tantamount to
unequal protection, in effect creating a lower or even non-exis-
tent standard of justice for the poor and near-poor.  At first there
was great resistance to abandoning this view. But recognizing
the limitations of scarce resources, the LSC in the late 1990s
adopted a dramatically different strategy for carrying out its mis-
sion to promote equal access to the justice system.  Rather than
insisting on full-representation for all of its clients, the LSC
sought to increase the availability of legal services to eligible
persons by providing legal information and limited assistance to
those individuals with relatively uncomplicated problems.  It
could then reserve full representation for those individuals with
more complicated cases, and those who, due to cognitive or
emotional limitations, would be unable to pursue claims effec-
tively on their own.  This strategy was implemented by requir-
ing local agencies to specify how they planned to meet the needs
of self-represented litigants, and to document how effectively
they had done so, as a condition of receiving federal funding.
A similar dynamic also took place in many local pro bono
programs.  Due to increased specialization within the legal pro-
fession as well as limitations on the amount of time and
resources that individual lawyers could devote to full-represen-
tation on a pro bono basis, many local programs established
legal hotlines and clinics in which lawyers could contribute a
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[T]he majority of self-
represented litigants
had legitimate legal
problems that could
only be resolved
through judicial 
intervention, but could
not obtain affordable
legal assistance.
couple of hours each
month for consultation
on routine legal matters
without undertaking
ongoing responsibility for
the case.  Similar efforts
include legal workshops
or clinics that educate
people about legal rights
and provide minimal
assistance in completing
court documents.
Both the LSC and the
pro bono approaches are
the no-fee corollary of
the “unbundled” model
of legal services delivery
in which lawyers undertake discrete legal tasks—consultation
and legal advice, preparation or review of legal forms, in-court
representation—for a full or only slightly reduced fee.  This
model makes it possible for individuals to obtain access to
competent legal advice and assistance on those aspects of their
cases that they most desire help, without paying full legal fees
for tasks that they feel comfortable doing themselves.  It also
accommodates the desires of many litigants to have a more
active role in how their cases are managed, including the time-
liness of a final resolution.
The unbundled services model has not been enthusiastically
embraced in all parts of the country.  Many lawyers express
concerns about the ethical obligations of discrete task repre-
sentation as well as the potential for professional malpractice
liability.  A secondary concern is whether the local judiciary
will respect limited representation agreements.  Recent changes
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly permit
these types of arrangements, provided that they are reasonable
under the circumstances and that the client gives informed
consent to the agreement.5 Even with these assurances, this
model poses challenges for lawyers.  To be a cost-effective
model for both lawyers and clients, for example, the lawyer
must have the immediate knowledge required to provide com-
petent legal advice and assistance in a timely manner: there is
no opportunity for a lawyer to spend two to ten hours research-
ing a legal question at $100 or more per hour.  Thus, lawyers
must know the law very well and be fairly proficient with diag-
nostic interviews in order to provide competent legal assistance
on an unbundled basis, skills that are generally not the
province of younger, less experienced lawyers.
The rise in consumer demand for unbundled legal services
has helped to draw a distinction between what are quintessen-
tially legal services—that is, the tasks that form the core of the
ever-ambiguous phrase “practice of law”—and those tangential
services that lawyers have traditionally performed for clients in
the course of carrying out the representation.  This then has
become the starting point for how the court and legal commu-
nities address the second set of factors that impede access to
justice for self-represented litigants: restrictions on the avail-
ability of legal information that litigants need to make informed
decisions about how to pursue a claim or defense, including
whether to retain a lawyer for some or all of the case.
LEGAL INFORMATION AND LEGAL ADVICE
Richard Zorza, lawyer, author,6 and consultant to many
courts and legal organizations on access to justice issues, has a
useful illustration to explain the distinction between legal
advice and legal information:  “If you ask a question of two
lawyers, and get two different answers, and neither lawyer is
committing malpractice, that is legal advice.  But if there is only
one right answer, that is legal information.”  Legal information
should be available to all people and from any source, including
non-lawyers and even court staff (who are uniquely knowledge-
able about legal information, especially local court procedure).7
Although obviously tongue-in-cheek, Zorza’s explanation is
a useful one for thinking about what lawyers do for clients that
clients are unable to effectively do for themselves.  It also  dis-
tinguishes those functions from those that individuals can do
for themselves if given access to accurate legal information.  A
recent project of the National Center for State Courts, con-
ducted in cooperation with the Chicago-Kent College of Law
and the Illinois Institute of Technology’s Institute of Design,8
identified five categories of legal services, defining that term as
the composite of legal advice and legal information that consti-
tutes traditional legal representation in the civil justice system.
These five categories—diagnosis, logistics, strategies, resolu-
tion, and enforcement—are the areas that self-represented liti-
gants appear to struggle with the most.  As we shall see, most
of these categories have varying mixtures of legal advice and
legal information, so identifying the aspects of each category
that consist mainly of legal advice provides a preliminary tem-
plate for the tasks that the legal community might provide
through a model of unbundled legal services.  Similarly, the
specific aspects of each category that consist mainly of legal
information can be the starting point for either the courts or
the legal community to provide information services for self-
represented litigants.
Diagnosis
The diagnosis category is premised on the assumption that
most individuals, given the tools to do so, will attempt to
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resolve problems in a rational and responsible manner—legally
and effectively.  So when confronted with a legal problem, the
most important questions for which people seek answers are:
• What are my legal options?
• Are any legal, financial, moral, or other important impli-
cations related to those options?
• How are those options pursued?
• How much time, money, and other resources are needed
to pursue those options?
To answer those questions, lawyers typically help guide their
clients through a logical decision tree of varying complexity
depending on the type of problem under consideration.  Take,
for example, someone consulting a lawyer about a divorce.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical issues that would arise in the
decision-tree analysis.
In most jurisdictions, the number of legal options available to
a client is generally two, and at most three.9 The first option is
to do nothing and stay legally married, which has obvious
implications not only in terms of ongoing animosity (presum-
ably the client is not seeking to dissolve an otherwise happy
marriage) but also restrictions on future relationships (the client
cannot remarry until the existing marriage is legally dissolved)
and continued legal responsibility for the welfare and future
legal obligations incurred by the spouse.  The second option is
to obtain a divorce from a court of competent jurisdiction. A
good lawyer would first discuss with the client the requirements
for filing for divorce, including residency inthe jurisdiction and
satisfaction of any statutorily-defined period of legal separation.
Then the lawyer would discuss obvious implications of divorce
including the need to decide on the disposition of children (cus-
tody, visitation, child support), spousal support, and property
disposition. After
explaining the available
options and their impli-
cations, a lawyer would
typically answer ques-
tions about how to pur-
sue those options, such
as where to file for
divorce (forum selec-
tion) and what steps
may be necessary before
filing (such as legal sepa-
ration, required in some
states).
Finally, the lawyer
would discuss with the client the time, money, and other
resources that would be necessary to pursue each of these
options.  For example, the lawyer would advise the client about
the probability of different outcomes of the divorce decree,
such as the likely range of child or spousal support; the typical
amount of time until the final divorce decree would be issued;
the estimated costs including legal fees, court costs, and related
expenses; the amount of out-of-court preparation required of
the client for collecting relevant documents and affidavits for
necessary witnesses; and the likely number of in-court appear-
ances.
In this scenario, the initial steps are more accurately
described as legal information.  Typically they are stated as pos-
itive law in state statutes and court rules.  It is only in the final
step of providing advice based on the client’s facts that legal
judgment and experience—the hallmarks of the practice of
law—become more prominent and the intrinsic value of a
lawyer becomes more evident.  It is also precisely the kind of
information and advice that people need to make an informed
decision about whether they would be able to represent them-
selves effectively.  Indeed, many self-represented litigants
underestimate the amount of preparation needed for their cases
and, if fully advised of the time and resources involved, might
choose to seek assistance from a lawyer for some or all of the
case.  Obviously, this illustration is fairly straightforward.  In
other types of cases in which the positive law is less clear cut,
the threshold where legal information blurs into legal advice
might occur much earlier in the consultation.
Logistics
Once all the legal options have been explored and one
option agreed upon, the next area of legal expertise for which
clients traditionally rely on lawyers involves carrying out the
myriad of logistical steps necessary to bring the matter within
the legal jurisdiction of the court for consideration.  Other than
the choice of forum (where a choice even exists), knowledge of
these steps mainly consists of legal information rather than
legal judgment.  But carrying out these logistics can involve a
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9. Some jurisdictions, such as Virginia and Kentucky, permit divorce
“from bed and board,” which operates to sever the spouses’ rights
to property acquired after the divorce as well as legal responsibil-
ity for liability incurred by the former spouse, but does not per-
mit either spouse to remarry and does not affect inheritance rights
(e.g. , dower, curtesy).
FIGURE 1: DIAGNOSTICS OF A DIVORCE ACTION
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staggering number of
individual steps: drafting
pleadings, including all
accompanying forms and
affidavits; filing the
pleadings with the court;
paying the court fees or
applying for a waiver for
indigent litigants; arrang-
ing for service of process,
either through the court,
with the sheriff, or with a
private process server;
fulfilling any mandatory
requirements to proceed,
such as attending a parenting class or mandatory mediation; fil-
ing supplemental papers (separation agreement, financial affi-
davits); and then taking any formal steps needed to set the case
on the calendar.  After becoming aware of how tedious some of
the steps can be, litigants who can afford to do so may opt to
have a lawyer carry out some or all of these tasks, but there is
little about these steps that requires the level of legal judgment
that clients would ordinarily only receive from an experienced
lawyer.
Strategies
After arranging for the logistics of a civil claim, the next
step involves deciding on a strategy with which to pursue or
defend the claim.  The two most common strategies are to
negotiate the dispute and try to arrive at a mutually agreeable
settlement or to prepare for formal litigation before a judge or
other judicial officer.  As a practical matter, this decision is
strongly tied to the litigant’s objectives concerning the case.
The litigant obviously has superior knowledge of his or her
own objectives, and those preferences should ordinarily be
given great deference by the lawyer.10 But the decision also
relies heavily on the lawyer’s judgment about which course of
action would best secure the client’s objectives, so there is a
great deal of added value from the information and advice a
competent lawyer can impart.
One common misconception by many self-represented liti-
gants is that, once they have filed their case, the court takes full
responsibility for future decisions on the merits of the case.
Few self-represented litigants realize that the vast majority of
cases are disposed of through a bilateral agreement of the par-
ties (settlement) or a unilateral decision by one of the parties
(default judgment or dismissal for failure to prosecute), not by
a trial on the merits.  Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the col-
lective body of law referred to as civil procedure exists largely
to prepare for trial, an event that very rarely happens.  Judges,
of course, are well aware that if full judicial review of the facts
and the law was required to resolve each case, the civil justice
system would come to a grinding halt in a matter of days.
There is an implicit expectation that parties will continue to
negotiate with one another even after the case has been filed,
hopefully arriving at some mutually agreeable arrangement
that will alleviate the need for the court to expend time and
effort deciding the case, or at least restrict that effort to a review
of the agreement to ensure that it meets minimum legal
requirements (e.g., child support, visitation).  
Unfortunately, there are few mechanisms to inform self-rep-
resented litigants about this implicit expectation.
Consequently, many self-represented litigants are unaware that
they retain the ability to formulate their own resolution, and
indeed that their resolution might be more advantageous to
both parties than any that the court might impose.  Although
some courts have implemented mandatory mediation or other
alternative dispute resolution programs that provide an oppor-
tunity to inform self-represented litigants about the possibility
of a negotiated disposition, and even provide a structured
forum for conducting the negotiations, not all do so.
If self-represented litigants are largely unaware that they can
negotiate rather than litigate their cases, they are also unin-
formed of what they must do to prepare for litigation.  Most
self-represented litigants work under the misconception that a
hearing is their first opportunity to tell their side of the story.
The reality is that, for many, it is their last.  Lawyers, of course,
understand the importance of preparation, which involves the
factual and legal documentation of the case.  Exchanging inter-
rogatories, conducting depositions to discover factual informa-
tion under the control of the opposing party, and issuing sub-
poenas to compel witness appearances are all part of trial
preparation.  As a practical matter, however, most cases involv-
ing self-represented litigants do not generally require a great
deal of discovery or legal preparation in that they tend to be
factually and legally quite straight forward.  Another compo-
nent of preparation is learning the niceties of court presenta-
tion, such as court etiquette (e.g., how to address the judge and
how to address the opposing counsel or party, if at all) and trial
logistics (e.g., the order of trial, how to get documentary or
demonstrative evidence admitted, how to frame questions to
witnesses on direct and cross-examination).
Both negotiation and preparation for trial are skills that
lawyers acquire with training and experience, but they are not
solely dependent on legal judgment.  Some self-represented lit-
igants can represent their interests quite well in negotiations,
perhaps even better than lawyers, if they are only informed of
the benefits of doing so.  Trial preparation is another thing
entirely.  Many self-represented litigants are understandably
intimidated by the courtroom environment and are uncomfort-
able with the formality of trial procedure.  Although some do
reasonably well with coaching from a seasoned legal profes-
sional, limited representation for in-court proceedings is
another task for which many litigants would be willing to pay
reasonable legal fees.
Resolution and Enforcement
In spite of the complexity of the trial process, a commend-
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able number of self-represented litigants prevail in their cases
each year.  Some of those cases are largely administrative pro-
ceedings that require little more than dogged determination
and perseverance.  In other cases, self-represented litigants
demonstrate a remarkable degree of legal sophistication despite
their lack of formal legal education and training.  Even so, one
of the biggest stumbling blocks takes place when the judge
issues an oral judgment in favor of a self-represented litigant,
and then turns to the litigant and requests him or her to com-
mit the judgment to writing and submit it to the court for the
judge’s signature—which leads back to the logistical problem of
drafting court documents.  There are few templates or model
court forms that a self-represented litigant can examine to get
an idea of what a written order might look like, much less what
should be included in it.  Many self-represented litigants, even
though they have won their cases, lack knowledge about how
to translate the judge’s oral statement into a binding and
enforceable written instrument—if, indeed, they have thor-
oughly understood the judge’s oral judgment.
Even for cases in which the court drafts its own final orders,
self-represented litigants are rarely knowledgeable about how
to enforce these judgments in any meaningful way.  Thus per-
petuates the myth of the self-enforcing judgment in which,
magically, the judgment-debtor pays the full amount of the
debt, mortgage and finance companies are notified that a newly
divorced person is no longer obligated on a previously jointly-
held note, etc.  Some self-represented litigants believe that the
court pays the judgment, then collects from the judgment-
debtor.  Rarely are self-represented litigants given any informa-
tion about their options for enforcing a judgment (e.g., lien or
seizure of assets, garnishment), which brings them back to the
beginning of the litigation cycle again: diagnosis of their legal
options and the associated implications, the logistics of
enforcement, and the most effective strategies and resolutions.
From an examination of the specific legal tasks involved in
pursuing litigation, it becomes clear that access to legal infor-
mation is the most critical need of self-represented litigants in
the vast majority of cases.  Legal judgment—the reasonable
inferences that an experienced legal professional makes based
on available information—can be critical to litigants in more
complicated cases in which the sheer volume and complexity
of legal information requires more time than the average
layperson can commit to preparing his or her own case.  But in
less complex cases, self-represented litigants are typically able
to make reasonable inferences from legal information, and thus
the need for access to legal advice can be very helpful, but is
not absolutely necessary.  The question then becomes who is
best situated to provide accurate legal information to self-rep-
resented litigants, and to encourage litigants to seek legal
advice in appropriate circumstances.
WHAT COURTS AND
LAWYERS CAN DO
Ethical constraints on
judges, court staff, and
lawyers mandate some sep-
aration of the spheres of
assistance that can be
offered to self-represented
litigants.  Judges and court
staff operate under require-
ments of neutrality and
objectivity, and lawyers
operate under requirements
of competence and the
avoidance of conflicts.  But
there is no inherent ethical
restriction on cooperation between the courts and the legal
community in providing services that would meet the needs of
self-represented litigants in a more-or-less seamless manner.11
So how can courts and legal service providers address each of
the categories described above to improve access to justice for
self-represented litigants?
Much of the decision-tree analysis that takes place during
diagnosis relies on legal information, rather than legal advice,
meaning that either the court or the legal community could eth-
ically provide this information, and many do.  A popular
approach for many courts is to provide model court forms and
instructions for the most common types of cases, such as
divorce (with or without children), child support initiation and
modification, and small claims.  The biggest problem arises in
the context of how to help self-represented litigants evaluate
their legal options, including the option to proceed without
legal representation.  Some courts have addressed this dilemma
through collaborations with the local legal community to pro-
vide consultation services for a nominal fee (e.g., $25 for a half-
hour consultation) on an unbundled basis as part of the courts’
assistance programs for self-represented litigants.  Self-repre-
sented litigants get the advantage of early consultation with a
lawyer, and lawyers have an opportunity for future business if
the litigant chooses to hire a lawyer to handle some or all of the
case.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, has
taken this approach a step further.  Part of the lawyer’s consul-
tation12 involves an assessment of case complexity as well as
the self-represented litigant’s emotional and intellectual ability
to represent him or herself, and a formal recommendation
about whether to proceed without a lawyer or not.  (The vast
majority of litigants—well over 90%—are given the green light
to proceed pro se.)  The Maryland Legal Assistance Network
has also developed a technology application that provides a
self-assessment tool for would-be self-represented litigants.13
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11. John Greacen has written most eloquently about how courts can
provide legal information to self-represented litigants without
transgressing established ethical boundaries.  See Greacen, supra
note 7.
12. Lawyers who participate in this program are hired under a con-
tract with the court and do not receive fees from the litigants.
13. It is located on the web at http://www.peoples-law.com. Use the
website’s search function to locate the “Checklist for Divorce Self-
Representation.”
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The online question-
naire helps litigants
determine the advisabil-
ity of proceeding with-
out a lawyer by focusing
on litigants’ personality
traits, motivation, orga-
nizational skills, knowl-
edge of basic legal con-
cepts, and knowledge of
specific issues or prob-
lems that add complex-
ity to otherwise routine
cases.  The litigant’s
responses to questions
are then evaluated, and
the scoring measures
indicate the likelihood
of success as a self-repre-
sented litigant in terms of ability to navigate the civil justice
system (but not in terms of case outcome).  For those who
score low on the self-assessment test, the website includes links
to a variety of public and private legal service providers who
offer reduced fee and pro bono services on either an unbundled
or full-service representation basis. 
Finally, most courts would be reluctant (and rightly so) to
make predictions about cases filed by self-represented litigants
(e.g., how long before a final decision is made, what will the
outcome be).  But there is no reason why courts cannot make
general information available that could help self-represented
litigants gauge such things for themselves (e.g., average filing-
to-disposition times for uncontested divorce cases, average
number of court appearances).  Many courts collect this infor-
mation routinely for caseload management purposes, and
there is no apparent reason that it could not be provided to the
public.  
Addressing the logistics of self-representation is more chal-
lenging, since the actual process of initiating and carrying out
litigation in most courts is extremely complex for persons with-
out training or experience in civil procedure.  Although the
purpose of court procedure is to preserve the rights of litigants
and to manage court caseloads efficiently, procedures that were
created to address new situations or types of cases often accu-
mulate in ways that are internally inconsistent or that obscure
the underlying purpose of those procedures.  Take, for exam-
ple, process requirements concerning who can serve court
papers on litigants.  In the early days of the U.S. Postal Service,
when timely delivery of the mail was less reliable than it is
today, most courts required service of process to be performed
by law enforcement or professional process servers to ensure
that litigants actually received notice of the suit and could tes-
tify to that effect if necessary.  Since then, of course, postal ser-
vice has improved dramatically and many courts now explicitly
permit service of process by first-class or registered mail.  Case
law in some states provides that actual notice is sufficient even
if the litigant has not adhered to formal service procedures.  All
too frequently, however, statutes and court rules retain refer-
ences to outmoded procedures and as a result, litigants are led
to believe that the process involves multiple steps, multiple
forms, and sometimes even multiple agencies (e.g., local sher-
iff and private process server).14
The first step, then, to reducing the level of logistical com-
plexity involves evaluating existing procedures to identify the
steps of the process that cause self-represented litigants the
most trouble and to focus on simplifying those steps.  Doing so,
of course, requires judges and court staff to shift their frame of
reference about the cause of problems encountered by self-rep-
resented litigants.  An example from the glory days of the
American railroad helps to illustrate how this frame of refer-
ence affects the efficiency of the overall system.15 In the early
days of the American railroad, head-on collisions of locomo-
tives were a common occurrence, ostensibly due to “operator
error” by signalmen who failed to alert conductors of oncom-
ing rail traffic on the next segment of track.  At some point,
however, the railroad companies changed their frame of refer-
ence from thinking about these accidents as operator error to
thinking about them as system errors.  To address the systemic
problem, they began laying two sets of railroad tracks side by
side, with each set dedicated to trains traveling in a certain
direction, thus eliminating the potential for signalman errors.
Miraculously, the number of operator errors associated with
head-on collisions declined precipitously.
In the context of the civil justice system, the way for courts
to address the logistical problems of self-represented litigants is
to stop thinking of common mistakes as “operator error” and
to begin thinking about how to correct the system errors that
frequently cause operators to fail.  Take, for example, the com-
mon complaint of court staff of having to reschedule hearings
due to failure to arrange for service of process on the opposing
party, either because self-represented litigants didn’t know that
service of process was required or they didn’t understand how
to go about doing it.  Both Delaware and Virginia addressed this
issue by having the court take responsibility for service of
process at the time pleadings are filed.  Court staff there take all
of the information needed to perfect service of process from the
filing party, collect the appropriate fee, and provide the infor-
mation to the appropriate agency.  In most Virginia jurisdic-
tions, the local sheriff serves the papers; in Delaware, the court
has a contract with a private process server.  From the litigant’s
perspective, filing the necessary papers is a one-step process—
there is no need to contact another agency within the court (or
down the street or across town, depending on the location) or
to pay another set of fees.
Another common problem that can addressed through sys-
tem reform is the large proportion of cases that seem to lan-
guish indefinitely because litigants do not know how to move
to the next stage of the litigation process after they have filed
the initial pleadings.  Ultimately, many of these cases are dis-
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14. Moreover, many court procedures carry on long after the condi-
tions that led to their establishment have disappeared because the
costs involved in removing or reforming obsolete systems or pro-
cedures often exceed available funding, especially at the local level.
15. Thanks to Richard Zorza, who often uses this illustration in edu-
cational workshops on self-represented litigation.
missed for failure to prosecute (and are then refiled at some
later date).  Instead of requiring litigants to take some affirma-
tive step to alert the court that the case can proceed, some
courts have made the process self-perpetuating—as soon as the
litigant completes one step in the litigation process, the court
automatically schedules the next step on the court’s calendar
(e.g., registration for parenting classes, mandatory mediation,
pretrial conference).16 A detailed set of instructions about the
next procedural event is given to the litigant with information
about how to request a change to the schedule and the conse-
quences of failing to adhere to the schedule.
As explained above, assessing the dual strategies of negotia-
tion and preparation for litigation requires some degree of legal
judgment, but ultimately must comport with the litigant’s rea-
sonable objectives in pursuing the claim.  Although the assess-
ment itself tends to fall more appropriately to the legal com-
munity, the court can play a role by informing self-represented
litigants that settlement of outstanding disputes is always an
option available to them and by making institutional resources
(e.g., mediation or arbitration services) available that encour-
age settlement.  For litigants who opt to pursue litigation, a
brief pretrial conference with the judge or another court official
provides an opportunity to inform litigants about the court’s
expectations for trial.  Emphasizing the importance of subpoe-
nas for necessary witnesses and bringing all relevant documen-
tation can go a long way to alerting litigants of the importance
of pretrial preparation.
The same lessons about using instances of “operator error”
to identify system errors apply to the resolution and enforce-
ment stages of litigation.  Many cases involving self-represented
litigants require fairly routine final judgments that can easily be
drafted at the bench using preprinted forms or a standardized
template.  Doing so immediately at the end of the hearing will
relieve litigants’ discomfort as well as the potential for delay
and inaccuracy associated with forcing litigants to draft final
orders.  In addition to providing the written judgment, how-
ever, the court should explain the terms of the judgment and
advise self-represented litigants of the procedure to challenge
the judgment (e.g., appeals) or to modify the order if appropri-
ate in the future (e.g., child support).  Doing so in person at the
time of the hearing further emphasizes the finality of the order
and also provides an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings
about specific terms.
Because satisfaction of civil judgments relies heavily on the
cooperation of the judgment-debtor, many courts are reluctant
to offer self-represented litigants assistance with enforcement.  A
Colorado magistrate, however, has found a way to provide self-
represented litigants with information that can later be used to
assess the likelihood of collecting on a judgment and the
options for doing so.  At the end of the hearing, he provides the
litigants with his written judgment and advises the judgment-
debtor of any procedural remedies to challenge the judgment.
But before the judgment-debtor is permitted to leave the court-
room, the magistrate requires him or her to complete a brief set
of interrogatories includ-
ing place of employment
and the location and
account numbers of any
existing assets (e.g., bank
accounts), which is then
given to the judgment-
creditor.  If the parties are
unable to come to some
agreement about how the
debt will be satisfied, the
judgment-creditor already
has in his or her possession sufficient information to decide
whether to pursue legal enforcement of the judgment as well as
the best way to do so (i.e., garnishment, lien, or seizure of
assets).  If the judgment-debtor has no job and no assets, for
example, the judgment-creditor is saved the time and expense
of a probably futile future attempt to satisfy the judgment.
Some judges and lawyers, upon hearing of this practice,
question the propriety of having a magistrate provide assistance
to the judgment-creditor in collecting on the debt.  But the
judges in that court agreed with the magistrate’s explanation
that the practice does not violate judicial ethics of neutrality
because, as soon as he renders the final judgment, he is no
longer neutral with respect to the parties—he has just ruled that
one party wins and the other party loses.  Moreover, the magis-
trate also found the practice to be a significant benefit to the
court in that the amount of post-judgment proceedings to locate
and attach the assets of judgment-debtors declined dramatically.
Again, we see a court that has simplified its process—removing
the necessity for judgment-creditors to seek substantial court
oversight in the collection of debts—in response to the needs of
self-represented litigants.  Further, this change to meet the
needs of self-represented litigants has had a secondary effect of
making the court system itself more efficient.
COLLABORATION FOR SEAMLESS ACCESS TO JUSTICE
This article has focused on three distinct issues related to
self-represented litigation.  The first is that the demand for
affordable legal services has vastly outpaced the available sup-
ply.  Over two decades of efforts to increase access to affordable
legal services has not appreciably improved the situation and is
highly unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  It should be
no surprise, therefore, that increasing numbers of people
choose self-representation as the only feasible option for secur-
ing necessary legal rights and remedies.  In recognition of the
reality of litigants’ needs, the courts and the legal community
have slowly shifted from insistence on full-representation for
every litigant as a fundamental requirement of equal justice to
a more pragmatic approach, offering information and limited
counsel for those litigants who are capable of managing their
own cases and reserving full-representation for those with more
complex cases or fewer personal resources.
The effect of this shift has been increased awareness of the
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find that their calendar management improves significantly as
well.
distinction between legal information and legal advice that is
inherent in the specific tasks that lawyers traditionally perform
for clients under the general rubric of the “practice of law.”
Much of the value added by a lawyer’s services is the efficiency
derived from the lawyer’s existing knowledge of legal informa-
tion about available options and how to pursue them.  With
access to legal information, many laypersons are capable of per-
forming these tasks for themselves, albeit less efficiently.
Certainly one implication of this awareness has been a dramatic
shift in lawyer-client relationships as clients become more
informed and more insistent on taking an active role in the
management of their cases.  Indeed, a large body of academic
literature has developed that applauds the shift away from a
paternalistic relationship on the lawyer’s part to one of greater
respect for client autonomy.  It is possible that many who sup-
port the evolution of a more coequal lawyer-client relationship
failed to appreciate the implications that it might have in terms
of the mechanics of how lawyers practice law, especially the
increased demand for unbundled legal services, but it is clear
that this model of legal service delivery is becoming more pop-
ular in many parts of the country.
There is one aspect of the needs of self-represented litigants
that can only be addressed by the courts, and that is the com-
plexity of the judicial system itself.  We have seen, for example,
that much of the complexity of the judicial system has been
allowed to perpetuate because lawyers, who had already assim-
ilated information about the underlying basis for court proce-
dure, could navigate the system more deftly and sometimes even
use that information to gain a strategic advantage in litigation.
The influx of large numbers of self-represented litigants who are
unfamiliar with court procedures, however, places unmistakable
burdens not only on the litigants, but also on the courts them-
selves.  Although many judges and court staff express resent-
ment at having to “dumb down” the system to prevent “opera-
tor errors” by self-represented litigants, doing so clearly benefits
all litigants regardless of their representation status as well as
the courts themselves in terms of increased efficiency.   
The remaining dilemma, then, is how best to provide self-
represented litigants with access to accurate legal information,
including referrals to sources of legal advice in appropriate cir-
cumstances.  As a practical matter, who actually provides legal
information is a relatively minor consideration, although the
experience in many jurisdictions is that a collaborative
approach by the courts and the legal community is more effec-
tive than either one acting alone.  In terms of convenience and
a logical starting place for litigants, however, most of these
efforts should be housed within the courts or at least in fairly
close proximity, even if the legal community is the primary
source of information.  This model of collaboration has worked
well in the context of other types of service provision, such as
court-annex mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
programs, so there is little reason to think that it would not
work equally well in terms of assistance programs for self-rep-
resented litigants.  
From the perspective of the litigant, such arrangements pro-
vide relatively seamless access to justice, and do so with greater
efficiency and less awkwardness in preserving the legitimate
separation imposed by ethical constraints for both the courts
and the legal community.  Undoubtedly, the transition from the
traditional framework of full-service legal representation to
new models of access to legal information and legal advice has
been unsettling for the courts and for the legal community.  In
the long run, however, these models provide better access to
justice for far greater numbers of people than was previously
possible and promote better accountability of the courts and
the legal community to the people they serve.
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